Airpower And The Cult Of The Offensive

Nonfiction, History, Middle East, Persian Gulf War, Military
Cover of the book Airpower And The Cult Of The Offensive by Major John R. Carter, Tannenberg Publishing
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Major John R. Carter ISBN: 9781786252760
Publisher: Tannenberg Publishing Publication: November 6, 2015
Imprint: Tannenberg Publishing Language: English
Author: Major John R. Carter
ISBN: 9781786252760
Publisher: Tannenberg Publishing
Publication: November 6, 2015
Imprint: Tannenberg Publishing
Language: English

The belief that airpower is inherently offensive is a recurrent theme throughout airpower theory and doctrine. Before World War I, dogmatic belief in the dominance of the offense in land warfare affected the military decisions which resulted in the disaster of the trenches. Termed the “cult of the offensive” by scholars, faith in offense became so unshakable in pre-1914 Europe that military organizations dismissed as irrelevant the numerous indications of the waning power of the offense as technological developments strengthened the defense. With airpower’s professed inclination for offense, could a cult of the offensive perniciously trap airpower doctrine and lead to similarly disastrous consequences?

The study begins by establishing the theoretical background necessary for case study analysis. Airpower defense is defined as those operations conducted to deny another force’s air operations in a designated airspace. Airpower offenses are those operations in the airspace defended by another, or operations conducted outside of one’s actively defended airspace. The relationship between offense and defense is dissected to discover that airpower defense enjoys neither an advantage of position nor of time, so traditional Clausewitzian views relative to the power of the defense do not apply to airpower. Next, the study describes those factors which may inject, or reinforce, a preferential bias for offense into airpower strategy and doctrine. A cult of the offensive is defined as an organizational belief in the power of offense so compelling that the military organization no longer evaluates its offensive doctrine objectively. This leads to an examination of the ramifications postulated to result from offensive ideology.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

The belief that airpower is inherently offensive is a recurrent theme throughout airpower theory and doctrine. Before World War I, dogmatic belief in the dominance of the offense in land warfare affected the military decisions which resulted in the disaster of the trenches. Termed the “cult of the offensive” by scholars, faith in offense became so unshakable in pre-1914 Europe that military organizations dismissed as irrelevant the numerous indications of the waning power of the offense as technological developments strengthened the defense. With airpower’s professed inclination for offense, could a cult of the offensive perniciously trap airpower doctrine and lead to similarly disastrous consequences?

The study begins by establishing the theoretical background necessary for case study analysis. Airpower defense is defined as those operations conducted to deny another force’s air operations in a designated airspace. Airpower offenses are those operations in the airspace defended by another, or operations conducted outside of one’s actively defended airspace. The relationship between offense and defense is dissected to discover that airpower defense enjoys neither an advantage of position nor of time, so traditional Clausewitzian views relative to the power of the defense do not apply to airpower. Next, the study describes those factors which may inject, or reinforce, a preferential bias for offense into airpower strategy and doctrine. A cult of the offensive is defined as an organizational belief in the power of offense so compelling that the military organization no longer evaluates its offensive doctrine objectively. This leads to an examination of the ramifications postulated to result from offensive ideology.

More books from Tannenberg Publishing

Cover of the book Ensuring The Continued Relevance Of Long Range Surveillance Units by Major John R. Carter
Cover of the book The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir by Major John R. Carter
Cover of the book Determination And Effectiveness Of Wwii Strategic Bombing Strategy by Major John R. Carter
Cover of the book Airborne Deep Operational Maneuver by Major John R. Carter
Cover of the book “So Few” by Major John R. Carter
Cover of the book Military Adaptation In War: With Fear Of Change by Major John R. Carter
Cover of the book Spitfire Pilot [Illustrated Edition] by Major John R. Carter
Cover of the book The U.S. Army Airborne Division, 1942 To 1945: Concept, Combat, And Evolution by Major John R. Carter
Cover of the book Letters On Strategy Vol. II [Illustrated Edition] by Major John R. Carter
Cover of the book Old Herbaceous by Major John R. Carter
Cover of the book The British Colonial Experience In Waziristan And Its Applicability To Current Operations by Major John R. Carter
Cover of the book Fighting Squadron, A Sequel To Dive Bomber: by Major John R. Carter
Cover of the book Into The Beehive - The Somali Habr Gidr Clan As An Adaptive Enemy by Major John R. Carter
Cover of the book Pugnax The Gladiator by Major John R. Carter
Cover of the book Defensive Culmination - When Does The Tactical Commander Counterattack? by Major John R. Carter
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy