Anzio (Operation Shingle): An Operational Perspective

Nonfiction, History, Germany, European General, Military, United States
Cover of the book Anzio (Operation Shingle): An Operational Perspective by Captain Stephen P. Gray, Lucknow Books
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Captain Stephen P. Gray ISBN: 9781782897262
Publisher: Lucknow Books Publication: August 15, 2014
Imprint: Lucknow Books Language: English
Author: Captain Stephen P. Gray
ISBN: 9781782897262
Publisher: Lucknow Books
Publication: August 15, 2014
Imprint: Lucknow Books
Language: English

This case study analyzes the role of operational art in Allied operations at Anzio, Italy and the battle for Rome (January 22-June 4, 1944). As part of the Allied Campaign in Italy, the amphibious assault on Anzio-code-named Operation Shingle, and the subsequent drive to Rome remains one of the most controversial military operations in history. Although the Allies eventually captured Rome from the Germans, the failure to use 'operational thinking' led to a poorly planned and executed operation.
Most historical accounts blame the failures at Anzio on the lack of aggressiveness by the Operation Shingle commander Major General John P. Lucas. However, when viewed in the larger context of the strategy to defeat Germany and the Allied Campaign in Italy, Operation Shingle is a showcase of failure at the operational level of war. Political rather than military considerations drove Shingle-dooming the operation from the start.
Anzio demonstrates the importance of linking tactical actions to operational and strategic objectives. At the strategic level of war, the Allies had a sound strategy to defeat Germany. However, at the operational level of war, the decision to launch Shingle did not adequately assess risk. In operational design, commanders failed to define an objective, lacked sufficient mass, and did not include alternative plans based on potential enemy actions. During planning and preparation, the Allies misjudged the enemy's center of gravity and failed to exploit valuable intelligence. During execution, operational leadership lacked initiative. Finally, the complexity and tensions created by the combined operation made unity of effort difficult. These lessons should benefit future operations.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

This case study analyzes the role of operational art in Allied operations at Anzio, Italy and the battle for Rome (January 22-June 4, 1944). As part of the Allied Campaign in Italy, the amphibious assault on Anzio-code-named Operation Shingle, and the subsequent drive to Rome remains one of the most controversial military operations in history. Although the Allies eventually captured Rome from the Germans, the failure to use 'operational thinking' led to a poorly planned and executed operation.
Most historical accounts blame the failures at Anzio on the lack of aggressiveness by the Operation Shingle commander Major General John P. Lucas. However, when viewed in the larger context of the strategy to defeat Germany and the Allied Campaign in Italy, Operation Shingle is a showcase of failure at the operational level of war. Political rather than military considerations drove Shingle-dooming the operation from the start.
Anzio demonstrates the importance of linking tactical actions to operational and strategic objectives. At the strategic level of war, the Allies had a sound strategy to defeat Germany. However, at the operational level of war, the decision to launch Shingle did not adequately assess risk. In operational design, commanders failed to define an objective, lacked sufficient mass, and did not include alternative plans based on potential enemy actions. During planning and preparation, the Allies misjudged the enemy's center of gravity and failed to exploit valuable intelligence. During execution, operational leadership lacked initiative. Finally, the complexity and tensions created by the combined operation made unity of effort difficult. These lessons should benefit future operations.

More books from Lucknow Books

Cover of the book Voyage Of The Deutschland, The First Merchant Submarine by Captain Stephen P. Gray
Cover of the book With Cavalry In 1915, The British Trooper In The Trench Line, Through Second Battle Of Ypres [Illustrated Edition] by Captain Stephen P. Gray
Cover of the book Operational Tenets Of Generals Heinz Guderian And George S. Patton, Jr by Captain Stephen P. Gray
Cover of the book With The Fleet In The Dardanelles, Some Impressions Of Naval Men And Incidents During The Campaign In The Spring Of 1915 by Captain Stephen P. Gray
Cover of the book Letters Written Home From France In The First Half Of 1915 by Captain Stephen P. Gray
Cover of the book Special Force: Origin And Development Of The Jedburgh Project In Support Of Operation Overlord by Captain Stephen P. Gray
Cover of the book Operation Overlord, Design And Reality; The Allied Invasion Of Europe by Captain Stephen P. Gray
Cover of the book From Volturno To The Winter Line by Captain Stephen P. Gray
Cover of the book A Company Of Tanks [Illustrated Edition] by Captain Stephen P. Gray
Cover of the book The Twelfth US Air Force: Tactical And Operational Innovations In The Mediterranean Theater Of Operations, 1943-1944 by Captain Stephen P. Gray
Cover of the book The Man Who Started the War by Captain Stephen P. Gray
Cover of the book Important Differences Between Successful And Unsuccessful Senior Allied Army Combat Leaders by Captain Stephen P. Gray
Cover of the book Comparison Of The Invasion Of Crete And The Proposed Invasion Of Malta by Captain Stephen P. Gray
Cover of the book Three Years With The New Zealanders [Illustrated Edition] by Captain Stephen P. Gray
Cover of the book Popskiā€™s Private Army by Captain Stephen P. Gray
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy