Armageddon's Lost Lessons: Combined Arms Operations in Allenby's Palestine Campaign - 1918 World War I Rout of Turkish Forces at Battle of Megiddo, Foreshadowing of German Blitzkrieg in World War II

This important report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. In September 1918, the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) concluded its campaign in Palestine by routing the Turkish forces at the battle of Megiddo. Under command of British general Allenby, the EEF successfully executed one of the most decisive engagements in any theater of World War I. Ably employing and synchronizing infantry, cavalry, and air forces, Allenby provided future military professionals and historians with a shining illustration of the efficacy of combined arms operations. In terms of surprise, concentration, and operational balance of forces, the culmination of the Palestine campaign was a foreshadowing of the German blitzkrieg used in World War II.
Unfortunately, the true lessons of Allenby's campaign were lost for future generations of military officers. Focusing on the culture and romanticism of the horse cavalry, students of the Palestine battles garnered little instruction on the emerging trends of combined arms operations that integrated air and ground mobility into a decisive operational-level weapon.
This paper analyzes the reasons those in the profession of arms missed the lessons of airpower and its role in combined arms operations. It examines the context of the Middle Eastern theater of World War I, describing how "western front myopia" added to the overshadowing of operations conducted in Palestine. The paper also delves into the role of airpower in the Middle East and how Allenby integrated a relatively new weapon system into his force structure and operational planning and execution. Though largely unexplored by military professionals and historians, Allenby's final campaign in Palestine proved to be a momentous step in the evolution of combined arms operations.
The myth of blitzkrieg that ensconced Hitler's forces in an aura of invulnerability during the opening phases of World War II has equally clouded history's view on the development of combined arms operations. While it appeared that a revolution in warfare was taking place on the European continent in the spring of 1940, a foreshadowing of blitzkrieg had taken place in the deserts of Palestine less than a quarter century before. There, on 19 September 1918, infantry, cavalry, and air forces under command of Gen Edmund H. H. "Bull" Allenby stormed through Turkish defenses at the battle of Megiddo. It was one of the greatest exhibitions of mobility and pursuit in the history of World War I and ultimately led to the surrender of the Ottoman Empire. In an era of costly trench warfare, Megiddo represented near perfection for the British in their use of combined arms operations and, in the process, enthralled both press and public.
For all its impact on popular sentiment at the time—its impact on the overall war effort was debated heatedly among British leadership in 1918—Megiddo appears to be more a foreshadowing of blitzkrieg than an influence on doctrinal development. In The Roots of Blitzkrieg, author James Corum gives no indication that the Palestine theater impacted German military reform during the interwar period. The British, for their part, appear to have missed a rare opportunity to learn what Megiddo might hold for the future of warfare. Focusing on the romanticism of the "last cavalry charge" instead of on the efficacy of combined arms operations, conservative military leaders saw the battle only as an illustration of the cavalry's enduring role as the arme blanche. Had they looked beyond their traditional mounts, one could argue that military leaders may have been better prepared to confront the Germans in the battles of 1940 to 1942.