Art of War Paper: Operations at the Border - Efforts to Disrupt Insurgent Safe-Havens, Dhofar, Oman, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency

Nonfiction, History, Military, Strategy
Cover of the book Art of War Paper: Operations at the Border - Efforts to Disrupt Insurgent Safe-Havens, Dhofar, Oman, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency by Progressive Management, Progressive Management
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Progressive Management ISBN: 9781310178269
Publisher: Progressive Management Publication: April 9, 2014
Imprint: Smashwords Edition Language: English
Author: Progressive Management
ISBN: 9781310178269
Publisher: Progressive Management
Publication: April 9, 2014
Imprint: Smashwords Edition
Language: English

Disrupting an insurgent's access to sanctuary and safe-haven is a critical aspect of operational planning for counterinsurgent forces. By denying an insurgent's access to safe-havens early in the conflict, the counterinsurgent will gain a marked advantage over the initially weaker force. Only through a deep understanding of how the insurgent is using international, tribal, or cultural borders to evade the counterinsurgent force can the counterinsurgent disrupt the insurgent operations. In order to accomplish this, the counterinsurgent must understand the physical terrain and cultural demographics, nest border operations into the overarching strategy, and employ security forces to reinforce success. Through the examination of the British experience in the North-West Frontier, 1849-1947 and the counterinsurgent efforts in the Sultanate of Oman's Dhofar Rebellion, 1962-1975, one can develop techniques for applying border control operations to disrupt insurgent safe-havens. Border control efforts are not the decisive effort within a counterinsurgency, but they are critical to defeating the insurgent's ability to maintain their ability to conduct operations.

Ever since the United States military entered a state of protracted conflict following the attacks by Al Qaeda in 2001, the study of counterinsurgency and limited war theory has come to the forefront of military thought. US military personnel reexamined theories of how to conduct counterinsurgency operations written in the 1950s and 1960s by British and French practitioners operating in Malaya, Algeria, and Vietnam. One of the ideas addressed in these writings was the denial of external support to an insurgent group. David Galula's seminal work Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, published in 1964, noted the importance of isolating an insurgency from its outside support to weaken an insurgent's material, political, and financial support.

The US Army Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, published in 2006, further reinforces this idea by stating, "access to external resources and sanctuaries has always influenced the effectiveness of insurgencies."

At the start of an insurgency, the counterinsurgent force, whether the host-nation or an interventionist power, has a distinct advantage over the insurgents. The counterinsurgent has the resources, bureaucracy, and institutions of a nation-state, while an insurgency is struggling to amass assets, control a population base, and build a capability to match the counterinsurgent. This initial weakness on the insurgent's part makes the insurgent dependent on outside support during the conflict for funding, equipment, and moral support. If the counterinsurgent force can focus its efforts to isolate the insurgent force from accessing their external support, the counterinsurgent force may be able to contain an insurgency during its early stages.

Contents: Chapter 1 - Introduction * Chapter 2 - What Is Insurgency? * Chapter 3 - Border Operations and Counterinsurgency * Chapter 4 - Case Study: The North-West Frontier * Chapter 5 - Case Study: The Dhofar Campaign, Oman

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

Disrupting an insurgent's access to sanctuary and safe-haven is a critical aspect of operational planning for counterinsurgent forces. By denying an insurgent's access to safe-havens early in the conflict, the counterinsurgent will gain a marked advantage over the initially weaker force. Only through a deep understanding of how the insurgent is using international, tribal, or cultural borders to evade the counterinsurgent force can the counterinsurgent disrupt the insurgent operations. In order to accomplish this, the counterinsurgent must understand the physical terrain and cultural demographics, nest border operations into the overarching strategy, and employ security forces to reinforce success. Through the examination of the British experience in the North-West Frontier, 1849-1947 and the counterinsurgent efforts in the Sultanate of Oman's Dhofar Rebellion, 1962-1975, one can develop techniques for applying border control operations to disrupt insurgent safe-havens. Border control efforts are not the decisive effort within a counterinsurgency, but they are critical to defeating the insurgent's ability to maintain their ability to conduct operations.

Ever since the United States military entered a state of protracted conflict following the attacks by Al Qaeda in 2001, the study of counterinsurgency and limited war theory has come to the forefront of military thought. US military personnel reexamined theories of how to conduct counterinsurgency operations written in the 1950s and 1960s by British and French practitioners operating in Malaya, Algeria, and Vietnam. One of the ideas addressed in these writings was the denial of external support to an insurgent group. David Galula's seminal work Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, published in 1964, noted the importance of isolating an insurgency from its outside support to weaken an insurgent's material, political, and financial support.

The US Army Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, published in 2006, further reinforces this idea by stating, "access to external resources and sanctuaries has always influenced the effectiveness of insurgencies."

At the start of an insurgency, the counterinsurgent force, whether the host-nation or an interventionist power, has a distinct advantage over the insurgents. The counterinsurgent has the resources, bureaucracy, and institutions of a nation-state, while an insurgency is struggling to amass assets, control a population base, and build a capability to match the counterinsurgent. This initial weakness on the insurgent's part makes the insurgent dependent on outside support during the conflict for funding, equipment, and moral support. If the counterinsurgent force can focus its efforts to isolate the insurgent force from accessing their external support, the counterinsurgent force may be able to contain an insurgency during its early stages.

Contents: Chapter 1 - Introduction * Chapter 2 - What Is Insurgency? * Chapter 3 - Border Operations and Counterinsurgency * Chapter 4 - Case Study: The North-West Frontier * Chapter 5 - Case Study: The Dhofar Campaign, Oman

More books from Progressive Management

Cover of the book Apollo and America's Moon Landing Program: Apollo 17 Official NASA Mission Reports and Press Kit - 1972 Sixth and Final Lunar Landing - Astronauts Cernan, Evans, and Schmitt by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Obamacare Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA or ACA) - 2011 Appeals Court Ruling Against the Individual Health Insurance Mandate, Plus Coverage of the Act and Implementation by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Oral Histories of Ballistic Missile Development Pioneers from the NASA Oral History Project: Featuring Simon Ramo, Co-founder of TRW, and General Bernard A. Schriever, USAF Missile Architect by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: Opposing Force OPFOR Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) Part 11 - Airspace and Air Defense Systems, Manpads, Russian SAM, Countermeasures, Technology Trends by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 2015 National Gang Report (NGR) - Violent Street and Prison Gangs, Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMG), Central American and Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (MTCOs), Drugs, Use of Social Media by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century Adult Cancer Sourcebook: Kaposi Sarcoma - Clinical Data for Patients, Families, and Physicians by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: Air Traffic Services Operations - FM 3-04.120 (FM 1-120) - Training, Maintenance (Professional Format Series) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Piercing the Fog: Intelligence and Army Air Forces Operations in World War II - ULTRA, MAGIC, Y-Service, European Theater, Air War in Europe, Pacific and Far East, Planning the Defeat of Japan by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Martial Arts Close Combat - Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-02B (Value-Added Professional Format Series) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book National Defense Intelligence College Paper: Imperialism With Chinese Characteristics? Reading and Re-Reading China's 2006 Defense White Paper - Chinese Military Expansion, Maoist Policy by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Oil as a Weapon of the 21st Century: Energy Security and the U.S. Pivot to Asia-Pacific - Transportation and Cyber Vulnerabilities, Climate Change, Chokepoints, China, Japan, Russia, Europe, Arab Oil by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Los Alamos: Beginning of an Era, 1943-1945, Military and Scientific Realities, Designing the Bomb, Trinity, Trial Run, Fission Bombs, H-bomb, Thermonuclear Program History by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: Marine Division Expeditionary Ground Combat Marine Corps Field Manual - FMFM 6-1 (Value-Added Professional Format Series) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Promises of Political Dialogue: Changes in Myanmar's Ceasefire Process - President Thein Sein and the Border Guard Forces (BGF), Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with Tatmadaw National Military by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Paradigm Lost: Rethinking Theater Airlift to Support the Army After Next - Cargo Handling Capability, Situational Awareness, Defensive Systems, C-130, C-17, CH-47D, V-22 Osprey, Austere Operations by Progressive Management
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy