Blame Game: Federal Intelligence Operations During The Chickamauga Campaign

Nonfiction, History, Modern, 19th Century, Americas, United States, Civil War Period (1850-1877), Military
Cover of the book Blame Game: Federal Intelligence Operations During The Chickamauga Campaign by Major Paul A. Shelton, Golden Springs Publishing
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Major Paul A. Shelton ISBN: 9781782896166
Publisher: Golden Springs Publishing Publication: August 15, 2014
Imprint: Golden Springs Publishing Language: English
Author: Major Paul A. Shelton
ISBN: 9781782896166
Publisher: Golden Springs Publishing
Publication: August 15, 2014
Imprint: Golden Springs Publishing
Language: English

This thesis examines intelligence operations conducted by Major General Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland during the initial phases of the Chickamauga Campaign (11 August to 16 September 1863). The thesis methodology is a detailed analysis of all intelligence reports received by the headquarters and a detailed examination of all outgoing correspondence from the headquarters intended to identify the analytical process used and the impact of intelligence on Rosecrans’ decision making during the campaign. The record shows that contrary to popular historical opinion there was significant intelligence available indicating the probable Confederate course of action. General Rosecrans and his staff actively discounted information that did not conform to their pre-conceived expectation or template of the enemy with tragic results for the Army of the Cumberland. This thesis highlights several timeless lessons of relevance to the modern military officer: the importance of focused intelligence collection operations, the requirement for clear thinking and disciplined analysis of intelligence reporting, the dangers of over-confidence and preconceptions, the hazard of focusing on one’s plan instead of the enemy, and the importance of avoiding “group-thinking” among a staff.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

This thesis examines intelligence operations conducted by Major General Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland during the initial phases of the Chickamauga Campaign (11 August to 16 September 1863). The thesis methodology is a detailed analysis of all intelligence reports received by the headquarters and a detailed examination of all outgoing correspondence from the headquarters intended to identify the analytical process used and the impact of intelligence on Rosecrans’ decision making during the campaign. The record shows that contrary to popular historical opinion there was significant intelligence available indicating the probable Confederate course of action. General Rosecrans and his staff actively discounted information that did not conform to their pre-conceived expectation or template of the enemy with tragic results for the Army of the Cumberland. This thesis highlights several timeless lessons of relevance to the modern military officer: the importance of focused intelligence collection operations, the requirement for clear thinking and disciplined analysis of intelligence reporting, the dangers of over-confidence and preconceptions, the hazard of focusing on one’s plan instead of the enemy, and the importance of avoiding “group-thinking” among a staff.

More books from Golden Springs Publishing

Cover of the book General Stand Watie’s Confederate Indians by Major Paul A. Shelton
Cover of the book German Observations And Evaluations Of The US Civil War: A Study In Lessons Not Learned by Major Paul A. Shelton
Cover of the book Inside The Confederate Government: The Diary Of Robert Garlick Kean by Major Paul A. Shelton
Cover of the book Wall Of Fire - The Rifle And Civil War Infantry Tactics by Major Paul A. Shelton
Cover of the book Wilson’s Creek Staff Ride And Battlefield Tour [Illustrated Edition] by Major Paul A. Shelton
Cover of the book High Tide At Gettysburg: The Campaign In Pennsylvania by Major Paul A. Shelton
Cover of the book The Effects Of Logistical Factors On The Union Pursuit Of The Confederate Army by Major Paul A. Shelton
Cover of the book Lone Star Marine by Major Paul A. Shelton
Cover of the book A Borderland Confederate by Major Paul A. Shelton
Cover of the book The Four Decisions That Changed The Course Of The American Revolution by Major Paul A. Shelton
Cover of the book General William Tecumseh Sherman's Georgia Campaigns: Lessons Learned For The Operational Commander by Major Paul A. Shelton
Cover of the book A History Of The Organizational Development Of The Continental Artillery During The American Revolution by Major Paul A. Shelton
Cover of the book Van Cleve At Chickamauga: The Study Of A Division’s Performance In Battle by Major Paul A. Shelton
Cover of the book Rebellion In Missouri 1861: Nathaniel Lyon And His Army Of The West by Major Paul A. Shelton
Cover of the book John Sargent by Major Paul A. Shelton
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy