Campaign Assessment in Counterinsurgency: Reinventing the Wheel - Vietnam War and MACV, Afghanistan and ISAF, Irrelevant Metrics Leading to Inaccurate and Useless Reports, Measures of Effectiveness

Nonfiction, History, Military, Vietnam War, Asian
Cover of the book Campaign Assessment in Counterinsurgency: Reinventing the Wheel - Vietnam War and MACV, Afghanistan and ISAF, Irrelevant Metrics Leading to Inaccurate and Useless Reports, Measures of Effectiveness by Progressive Management, Progressive Management
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Progressive Management ISBN: 9781370774999
Publisher: Progressive Management Publication: February 24, 2017
Imprint: Smashwords Edition Language: English
Author: Progressive Management
ISBN: 9781370774999
Publisher: Progressive Management
Publication: February 24, 2017
Imprint: Smashwords Edition
Language: English

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. Strategic and political leaders have determined that the US and ISAF campaign assessments were neither useful nor accurate. The DOD 1230 biannual report titled the Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan provides comprehensive information to strategic and political leaders regarding the progress of the United States' strategy in Afghanistan. The report, however, has largely provided indicators of progress based off a single variable—enemy initiated ambushes. As attention drew to the failure of ISAF to provide accurate reporting, a degree of mistrust grew between strategic and political leaders and the military leaders in Afghanistan. In turn, strategic leaders made only partially informed decisions that did not reflect accurately the progress on the ground. The July 2013 DOD 1230 report touted a change in metrics, placing a greater emphasis on variables such as security force development and economic growth. The announcement of new metrics raised an obvious question, were the new measures of performance in Afghanistan actually better, and why had change taken so long?

Answering this research question required four steps. First, it was necessary to determine the importance of assessments and measures of performance in the development of strategy in the COIN environment. Second, it was necessary to examine how ISAF initially developed its assessment plan. Next, it was necessary to examine a historical instance of campaign assessments in COIN. The US and MACV in Vietnam experienced similar complications throughout the Vietnam War. Initially accused of intentionally bloating casualty figures, MACV made a concentrated effort to develop a more accurate assessment model to inform progress. The improved model, the Hamlet Evaluation System, analyzed a host of variables across South Vietnam to assess progress over time. Lastly, by comparing the efforts in Vietnam with those in Afghanistan it was possible to identify assessment concepts that would have been applicable in Afghanistan.

The evidence ultimately shows that as the US and ISAF sought to develop assessment measures, they replicated the errors made in Vietnam. Additionally, despite advances in technology, ISAF's assessment plan did not reach the level of sophistication that MACV achieved in Vietnam. Although the HES was criticized during the Vietnam War, the iterative attempts by MACV to improve its assessment plan provided useful lessons for the US and ISAF in Afghanistan.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. Strategic and political leaders have determined that the US and ISAF campaign assessments were neither useful nor accurate. The DOD 1230 biannual report titled the Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan provides comprehensive information to strategic and political leaders regarding the progress of the United States' strategy in Afghanistan. The report, however, has largely provided indicators of progress based off a single variable—enemy initiated ambushes. As attention drew to the failure of ISAF to provide accurate reporting, a degree of mistrust grew between strategic and political leaders and the military leaders in Afghanistan. In turn, strategic leaders made only partially informed decisions that did not reflect accurately the progress on the ground. The July 2013 DOD 1230 report touted a change in metrics, placing a greater emphasis on variables such as security force development and economic growth. The announcement of new metrics raised an obvious question, were the new measures of performance in Afghanistan actually better, and why had change taken so long?

Answering this research question required four steps. First, it was necessary to determine the importance of assessments and measures of performance in the development of strategy in the COIN environment. Second, it was necessary to examine how ISAF initially developed its assessment plan. Next, it was necessary to examine a historical instance of campaign assessments in COIN. The US and MACV in Vietnam experienced similar complications throughout the Vietnam War. Initially accused of intentionally bloating casualty figures, MACV made a concentrated effort to develop a more accurate assessment model to inform progress. The improved model, the Hamlet Evaluation System, analyzed a host of variables across South Vietnam to assess progress over time. Lastly, by comparing the efforts in Vietnam with those in Afghanistan it was possible to identify assessment concepts that would have been applicable in Afghanistan.

The evidence ultimately shows that as the US and ISAF sought to develop assessment measures, they replicated the errors made in Vietnam. Additionally, despite advances in technology, ISAF's assessment plan did not reach the level of sophistication that MACV achieved in Vietnam. Although the HES was criticized during the Vietnam War, the iterative attempts by MACV to improve its assessment plan provided useful lessons for the US and ISAF in Afghanistan.

More books from Progressive Management

Cover of the book 2014 Final NTSB Aircraft Incident Report on Boeing 787 Dreamliner Airplane Yuasa Lithium Battery Fire Japan Airlines JA829J: Tests, Analysis, Conclusions and Recommendations by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century Solar Power and Photovoltaics: Energy Department Solar Energy Technologies Program Annual Report - Fiscal Year 2009 - Details on PV Technologies and Research by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf War and Bosnia Crisis - Rational Foreign Policy Decision Making Findings, National Security Council, Developing Endgame, Termination Policy by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Operationalizing the Impossible: The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Movement - Ending Genocide Through Prevention and Military Intervention, Cast Study of Rwanda, Bosnia, Humanitarian Intervention by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Apollo and America's Moon Landing Program: Apollo 16 Technical Crew Debriefing with Unique Observations about the Fifth Lunar Mission - Astronauts Young, Duke and Mattingly by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Joint Military Operations Historical Collection: Lessons Learned from Battles Large and Small, Hannibal, Grenada, Haiti, Panama, Gulf War Desert Storm, Korea Operation Chromite by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: Surprise Marine Corps Field Manual, War Strategy and Surprise in Military History - FMFRP 12-1 (Value-Added Professional Format Series) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book China's Role in Counter-Piracy Operations: Gulf of Aden (GOA), Southeast Asia, Cooperating with Other Navies, PLAN Modernization, ASEAN Economic Relationship, Somali Piracy, Mahanian Philosophy by Progressive Management
Cover of the book U.S. Air Force Aerospace Mishap Reports: Accident Investigation Boards for the E-4B Nightwatch Advanced Airborne Command Post, F-15C Eagle Fighter, QF-4E and QRF-4C Target Drones by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The First Flight Across the Atlantic, May 1919: Curtiss Flying Boat, NC-1, NC-4 Restoration by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Future of NATO: Russian Relations - or How to Dance with a Bear and Not Get Mauled, Vladimir Putin, Former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact States, OSCE, Response and Perspectives, Road to Rome by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Lessons from the Normandy Invasion of World War II: Staff Development, Deception Operations, and Force Projection - Complexity of Planning, Sluggish Progress, Signals Intelligence and SHAEF Staff by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: The Targeting Process - Field Manual 3-60 - Principles and Philosophy, Dynamic Targeting (Professional Format Series) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century Space Elevators: Advanced Earth-Space Infrastructure: NASA Report on Technology, Plans, Concepts, Materials, Environmental and Safety Issues by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Future of Command and Control: Complexity, Networking, and Effects-Based Approaches to Operations - Terrorism, the Post 9-11 World, von Moltke, Clausewitz, Decisionmaking during Apollo 13 by Progressive Management
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy