Cruise Missiles for the U. S. Navy: An Exemplar of Innovation in a Military Organization - Sperry's Aerial Torpedo, Project Aphrodite, Gorgon Missile, Drones, Regulus, Harpoon, Tomahawk

Nonfiction, History, Military, Weapons, Naval
Cover of the book Cruise Missiles for the U. S. Navy: An Exemplar of Innovation in a Military Organization - Sperry's Aerial Torpedo, Project Aphrodite, Gorgon Missile, Drones, Regulus, Harpoon, Tomahawk by Progressive Management, Progressive Management
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Progressive Management ISBN: 9781310360534
Publisher: Progressive Management Publication: May 7, 2016
Imprint: Smashwords Edition Language: English
Author: Progressive Management
ISBN: 9781310360534
Publisher: Progressive Management
Publication: May 7, 2016
Imprint: Smashwords Edition
Language: English

Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique book traces the development of the cruise missile by the U.S. Navy.

The nature of war at sea has changed through time as a direct consequence of innovations in technology, tactics and operational art, and naval organization. Success in future conflict , will depend upon the navy's ability to acquire appropriate new technologies and to integrate that technology into future forces. Senior naval officers and historians have identified cruise missile technology as an area where the navy resisted innovation, a failure that was blamed on intra-service political imperatives. Examination of the history of cruise missile innovation reveals a very different pattern. Over the past fifty years, the navy persistently pursued the development of cruise missile technology. The single significant gap in cruise missile development in the past half century, 1959-1967, resulted from unique historical circumstances of the time, and not organizational antipathy toward cruise missiles. Several lessons emerge from the history of naval cruise missile innovation. Prospects for success in future innovative endeavors can be enhanced by providing stable and ample resources to project scientists and engineers.

An examination of the history of naval cruise missile innovation demonstrates that, over the past 50 years, the Navy persistently pursued the development of cruise missile technology. The single interruption in cruise missile innovation, 1959-1967, resulted from extreme budgetary pressures and conflicting organizational priorities. While certain naval aviators indeed opposed the development of cruise missile technology, the facile historical interpretation of aviators opposing cruise missile innovation is not correct. Rather, the Navy has demonstrated a long interest in cruise missiles and undertook to acquire anti-ship missiles when the circumstances of mission and technology were finally right

Several lessons emerge from the history of Naval cruise missile innovation. The objectives of long-range technological innovation will probably be controversial. Leaders must be prepared to proceed in the face of well-intentioned opposition. Most innovative efforts end in failure; senior naval and government officials must expect and accept frequent failure as a cost of innovation. The prospects for success in future endeavors can be enhanced by providing steady and ample resources to projects. Naval leadership must guard against prematurely rushing new systems into operational evaluation or production. In deciding the future of ongoing projects, leaders should avoid the organizational myopia that results from judging future systems on the basis of today's needs. Finally, the Navy needs officers who are willing to promote new technologies: the zealots who crusade for their vision of future warfare and the technologies necessary for their vision. These zealots initiate the political process that leads to organizational innovation, and are a critical component of that innovation process.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique book traces the development of the cruise missile by the U.S. Navy.

The nature of war at sea has changed through time as a direct consequence of innovations in technology, tactics and operational art, and naval organization. Success in future conflict , will depend upon the navy's ability to acquire appropriate new technologies and to integrate that technology into future forces. Senior naval officers and historians have identified cruise missile technology as an area where the navy resisted innovation, a failure that was blamed on intra-service political imperatives. Examination of the history of cruise missile innovation reveals a very different pattern. Over the past fifty years, the navy persistently pursued the development of cruise missile technology. The single significant gap in cruise missile development in the past half century, 1959-1967, resulted from unique historical circumstances of the time, and not organizational antipathy toward cruise missiles. Several lessons emerge from the history of naval cruise missile innovation. Prospects for success in future innovative endeavors can be enhanced by providing stable and ample resources to project scientists and engineers.

An examination of the history of naval cruise missile innovation demonstrates that, over the past 50 years, the Navy persistently pursued the development of cruise missile technology. The single interruption in cruise missile innovation, 1959-1967, resulted from extreme budgetary pressures and conflicting organizational priorities. While certain naval aviators indeed opposed the development of cruise missile technology, the facile historical interpretation of aviators opposing cruise missile innovation is not correct. Rather, the Navy has demonstrated a long interest in cruise missiles and undertook to acquire anti-ship missiles when the circumstances of mission and technology were finally right

Several lessons emerge from the history of Naval cruise missile innovation. The objectives of long-range technological innovation will probably be controversial. Leaders must be prepared to proceed in the face of well-intentioned opposition. Most innovative efforts end in failure; senior naval and government officials must expect and accept frequent failure as a cost of innovation. The prospects for success in future endeavors can be enhanced by providing steady and ample resources to projects. Naval leadership must guard against prematurely rushing new systems into operational evaluation or production. In deciding the future of ongoing projects, leaders should avoid the organizational myopia that results from judging future systems on the basis of today's needs. Finally, the Navy needs officers who are willing to promote new technologies: the zealots who crusade for their vision of future warfare and the technologies necessary for their vision. These zealots initiate the political process that leads to organizational innovation, and are a critical component of that innovation process.

More books from Progressive Management

Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Guide To Mountain Operations MCRP 3-35.2A (Value-Added Professional Format Series) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The Relationship Between Islamism and Women in Civil Society: A Look at Turkey and Egypt - Muslims, Tanzimat Reforms, Kemalism, Islamist Faction, Sadat, Mubarak, Arab Spring, What About the Veil? by Progressive Management
Cover of the book U.S. Marine Corps Training Manual: Expeditionary Operations, MCDP 3 - USMC Marines Document Series by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Pathbreakers: U.S. Marine African American Officers in Their Own Words - Oral History Anthology with 21 Personal Accounts Covering 60 Years of Service - NASA Administrator Charles Bolden, Jr. by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Fire Monitoring Handbook (FMH Fire Management Program Center, National Interagency Fire Center) Part 2 - Wildfire and Wildland Fire Environmental and Fire Observation, Vegetation Monitoring Protocols by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Emergency Support Function 15: Communication Synchronization during Defense Support of Civil Authorities Operations - Whole-of-Government External and Public Affairs, Lessons from 9/11 and Katrina by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Challenge and Response: Anticipating U.S. Military Security Concerns - Future Wars and American Military Responses, Changing Nature of Warfare, Space Assets by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Elihu Root Study: The Total Army - United States Army War College Carlisle Scholars Program, 2016 Study on the Future of the United States Army - Strategic Environment, Culture, Command, Agility by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Wind Energy Multiyear Program Plan Through 2012: U.S. Department of Energy Programs for Large Wind, Systems Integration, Distributed Wind, Research and Development by Progressive Management
Cover of the book NASA's Space Shuttle Program: Astronaut Oral Histories (Set 3) - Leestma, Lenoir, Lounge, Lousma, Mattingly, Melroy, Mullane, Nagel, Nelson, O'Connor, Parker, Peterson - Columbia, Challenger Accidents by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Organization of Marine Corps Forces - Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 5-12D by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Seeing Off the Bear: Anglo-American Air Power Cooperation During the Cold War - Missiles, Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles, RAF Aircraft, Skybolt, Overflying the Soviet Union, Cuban Missile Crisis by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: Joint Force Land Component Commander Handbook (JFLCC) - U.S. Navy and U.S. Army Command Structure (Value-Added Professional Format Series) by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Lessons of the Iraqi De-Ba'athification Program for Iraq's Future and the Arab Revolutions: Saddam Hussein, Alawite, Syria and Assad, Yemen by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Have the Mexican Drug Cartels Evolved Into a Terrorist Insurgency? Drug Trafficking Street Gangs in Mexico, El Chapo, Los Zetas, Sinaloa, Beltran Leyva, Knights Templar, Juarez, Tijuana Cartels by Progressive Management
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy