De Gustibus

Arguing About Taste and Why We Do It

Nonfiction, Religion & Spirituality, Philosophy, Aesthetics, Art & Architecture, General Art
Cover of the book De Gustibus by Peter Kivy, OUP Oxford
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Peter Kivy ISBN: 9780191063756
Publisher: OUP Oxford Publication: October 22, 2015
Imprint: OUP Oxford Language: English
Author: Peter Kivy
ISBN: 9780191063756
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Publication: October 22, 2015
Imprint: OUP Oxford
Language: English

In De Gustibus Peter Kivy deals with a question that has never been fully addressed by philosophers of art: why do we argue about art? We argue about the 'facts' of the world either to influence people's behaviour or simply to get them to see what we take to be the truth about the world. We argue over ethical matters, if we are ethical 'realists,' because we think we are arguing about 'facts' in the world. And we argue about ethics, if we are 'emotivists,' or are now what are called 'expressionists,' which is to say, people who think matters of ethics are simply matters of 'attitude,' to influence the behaviour of others. But why should we argue about works of art? There are no 'actions' we wish to motivate. Whether I think Bach is greater than Beethoven and you think the opposite, why should it matter to either of us to convince the other? This is a question that philosophers have never faced. Kivy claims here that we argue over taste because we think, mistakenly or not, that we are arguing over matters of fact.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

In De Gustibus Peter Kivy deals with a question that has never been fully addressed by philosophers of art: why do we argue about art? We argue about the 'facts' of the world either to influence people's behaviour or simply to get them to see what we take to be the truth about the world. We argue over ethical matters, if we are ethical 'realists,' because we think we are arguing about 'facts' in the world. And we argue about ethics, if we are 'emotivists,' or are now what are called 'expressionists,' which is to say, people who think matters of ethics are simply matters of 'attitude,' to influence the behaviour of others. But why should we argue about works of art? There are no 'actions' we wish to motivate. Whether I think Bach is greater than Beethoven and you think the opposite, why should it matter to either of us to convince the other? This is a question that philosophers have never faced. Kivy claims here that we argue over taste because we think, mistakenly or not, that we are arguing over matters of fact.

More books from OUP Oxford

Cover of the book Electronic Structure Methods for Complex Materials by Peter Kivy
Cover of the book Multilingualism: A Very Short Introduction by Peter Kivy
Cover of the book Making Morality Work by Peter Kivy
Cover of the book After Modernity by Peter Kivy
Cover of the book Subtle is the Lord by Peter Kivy
Cover of the book The Lost Domain by Peter Kivy
Cover of the book The Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood by Peter Kivy
Cover of the book Samuel Beckett and the Politics of Aftermath by Peter Kivy
Cover of the book Fichte's Ethical Thought by Peter Kivy
Cover of the book Hugo Grotius and the Century of Revolution, 1613-1718 by Peter Kivy
Cover of the book Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and Nobody by Peter Kivy
Cover of the book On Folk Epistemology by Peter Kivy
Cover of the book Psychoanalysis: A Very Short Introduction by Peter Kivy
Cover of the book Legitimacy and Criminal Justice by Peter Kivy
Cover of the book The Twilight of Constitutionalism? by Peter Kivy
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy