Epistemic Situationism

Nonfiction, Religion & Spirituality, Philosophy, Epistemology
Cover of the book Epistemic Situationism by , OUP Oxford
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: ISBN: 9780192514738
Publisher: OUP Oxford Publication: April 15, 2017
Imprint: OUP Oxford Language: English
Author:
ISBN: 9780192514738
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Publication: April 15, 2017
Imprint: OUP Oxford
Language: English

This volume is the first sustained examination of epistemic situationism: the clash between virtue epistemology and the situationist hypothesis inspired by research in empirical psychology. Situationism began as a challenge to the psychology of character traits, targeting ethical theories that presuppose a trait psychology. Psychological research suggests that (often trivial) environmental variables have greater explanatory power than character traits. Epistemology pursues questions about the nature of knowledge. While there are internal differences within virtue epistemology between responsibilists and reliabilists, they all analyze knowledge in terms of epistemic virtues and vices. However, despite promising normative results, virtue epistemology appears to assume the same character-based psychology as virtue ethics does. Until recently, virtue epistemology and situationism were separate literatures, but philosophers have begun to examine the apparent incompatibility between situationist psychology and virtue epistemology. Much of the psychological research that raises questions about the empirical adequacy of the moral psychology of virtue ethics also appears to raise doubts about the empirical adequacy of the epistemic psychology assumed by virtue epistemology. Responsibilist virtue epistemology appears particularly vulnerable because epistemic virtues like open mindedness, conscientiousness and intellectual courage are traits of intellectual character, but reliabilist virtue epistemology appeals to the psychology of cognitive skills, abilities, and competences that may be similarly vulnerable. The essays in this volume take up this new problem of epistemic situationism from multiple points of view - some sceptical or revisionary, others conservative.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

This volume is the first sustained examination of epistemic situationism: the clash between virtue epistemology and the situationist hypothesis inspired by research in empirical psychology. Situationism began as a challenge to the psychology of character traits, targeting ethical theories that presuppose a trait psychology. Psychological research suggests that (often trivial) environmental variables have greater explanatory power than character traits. Epistemology pursues questions about the nature of knowledge. While there are internal differences within virtue epistemology between responsibilists and reliabilists, they all analyze knowledge in terms of epistemic virtues and vices. However, despite promising normative results, virtue epistemology appears to assume the same character-based psychology as virtue ethics does. Until recently, virtue epistemology and situationism were separate literatures, but philosophers have begun to examine the apparent incompatibility between situationist psychology and virtue epistemology. Much of the psychological research that raises questions about the empirical adequacy of the moral psychology of virtue ethics also appears to raise doubts about the empirical adequacy of the epistemic psychology assumed by virtue epistemology. Responsibilist virtue epistemology appears particularly vulnerable because epistemic virtues like open mindedness, conscientiousness and intellectual courage are traits of intellectual character, but reliabilist virtue epistemology appeals to the psychology of cognitive skills, abilities, and competences that may be similarly vulnerable. The essays in this volume take up this new problem of epistemic situationism from multiple points of view - some sceptical or revisionary, others conservative.

More books from OUP Oxford

Cover of the book The Working World of International Organizations by
Cover of the book Enactivist Interventions by
Cover of the book The Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology by
Cover of the book God: A Very Short Introduction by
Cover of the book Sovereign Debt Management by
Cover of the book Absolutism in Renaissance Milan by
Cover of the book Corporate Governance and Chairmanship by
Cover of the book Guardians of Republicanism by
Cover of the book Interpretation in International Law by
Cover of the book The Error of Truth by
Cover of the book Freedom and Reason by
Cover of the book When Humans Become Migrants by
Cover of the book Risk and Negligence in Wills, Estates, and Trusts by
Cover of the book Six Tragedies by
Cover of the book Subnational Authorities in EU Law by
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy