Models of Health Plan Payment and Quality Reporting

The book pulls together a series of articles by the authors that initiated the research areas of "optimal risk adjustment" and "optimal quality reporting." The papers present the basic theoretical models and link them to empirical application. Design of health insurance premiums to achieve efficient and fair outcomes is also covered. The chapters in the book also cover the intellectual development of approaches to health insurance regulation, beginning with more abstract models to those with explicit empirical and policy applications.

Contents:

• Optimal Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care (Jacob Glazer and Thomas G McGuire)
• Measuring Adverse Selection in Managed Health Care (Richard G Frank, Jacob Glazer and Thomas G McGuire)
• Setting Health Plan Premiums to Ensure Efficient Quality in Health Care: Minimum Variance Optimal Risk Adjustment (Jacob Glazer and Thomas G McGuire)
• Optimal Quality Reporting in Markets for Health Plans (Jacob Glazer and Thomas G McGuire)
• Using Global Ratings of Health Plans to Improve the Quality of Health Care (Jacob Glazer, Thomas G McGuire, Zhun Cao and Alan Zaslavsky)
• Gold and Silver Health Plans: Accommodating Demand Heterogeneity in Managed Competition (Jacob Glazer and Thomas G McGuire)
• Making Medicare Advantage a Middle-Class Program (Jacob Glazer and Thomas G McGuire)

Readership: Graduate students and researchers interested in regulation of health insurance markets. Key Features:

• Unified intellectual development of optimal regulation of health insurance markets
• Links to empirical application in risk adjustment and quality reporting