Pathological Counterinsurgency

How Flawed Thinking about Elections Leads to Counterinsurgency Failure

Nonfiction, Social & Cultural Studies, Political Science, International, International Security, Politics, History & Theory
Cover of the book Pathological Counterinsurgency by Samuel R. Greene, Lexington Books
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Samuel R. Greene ISBN: 9781498538190
Publisher: Lexington Books Publication: June 29, 2018
Imprint: Lexington Books Language: English
Author: Samuel R. Greene
ISBN: 9781498538190
Publisher: Lexington Books
Publication: June 29, 2018
Imprint: Lexington Books
Language: English

Pathological Counterinsurgency critically examines the relationship between elections and counterinsurgency success in third party campaigns supported by the United States. From Vietnam to El Salvador to Iraq and Afghanistan, many policymakers and academics believed that democratization would drive increased legitimacy and improved performance in governments waging a counterinsurgency campaign. Elections were expected to help overcome existing deficiencies, thus allowing governments supported by the United States to win the “hearts and minds” of its populace, undermining the appeal of insurgency. However, in each of these cases, campaigning in and winning elections did not increase the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent government or alter conditions of entrenched rent seeking and weak institutions that made states allied to the United States vulnerable to insurgency.

Ultimately, elections played a limited role in creating the conditions needed for counterinsurgency success. Instead, decisions of key actors in government and elites to prioritize either short term personal and political advantage or respect for political institutions held a central role in counterinsurgency success or failure. In each of the four cases in this study, elected governments pursued policies that benefited members of the government and elites at the expense of boarder legitimacy and improved performance. Expectations that democratization could serve as a key instrument of change led to unwarranted optimism about the likely of success and ultimately to flawed strategy. The United States continued to support regimes that continued to lack the legitimacy and government performance needed for victory in counterinsurgency.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

Pathological Counterinsurgency critically examines the relationship between elections and counterinsurgency success in third party campaigns supported by the United States. From Vietnam to El Salvador to Iraq and Afghanistan, many policymakers and academics believed that democratization would drive increased legitimacy and improved performance in governments waging a counterinsurgency campaign. Elections were expected to help overcome existing deficiencies, thus allowing governments supported by the United States to win the “hearts and minds” of its populace, undermining the appeal of insurgency. However, in each of these cases, campaigning in and winning elections did not increase the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent government or alter conditions of entrenched rent seeking and weak institutions that made states allied to the United States vulnerable to insurgency.

Ultimately, elections played a limited role in creating the conditions needed for counterinsurgency success. Instead, decisions of key actors in government and elites to prioritize either short term personal and political advantage or respect for political institutions held a central role in counterinsurgency success or failure. In each of the four cases in this study, elected governments pursued policies that benefited members of the government and elites at the expense of boarder legitimacy and improved performance. Expectations that democratization could serve as a key instrument of change led to unwarranted optimism about the likely of success and ultimately to flawed strategy. The United States continued to support regimes that continued to lack the legitimacy and government performance needed for victory in counterinsurgency.

More books from Lexington Books

Cover of the book Brazil and Canada by Samuel R. Greene
Cover of the book Black Mirror and Critical Media Theory by Samuel R. Greene
Cover of the book Facing South to Africa by Samuel R. Greene
Cover of the book Race, Gender, and Film Censorship in Virginia, 1922–1965 by Samuel R. Greene
Cover of the book Panic in the Loop by Samuel R. Greene
Cover of the book Memory, Empire, and Postcolonialism by Samuel R. Greene
Cover of the book Prying Open Fortress Europe by Samuel R. Greene
Cover of the book Strategic Intelligence–Community Security Partnerships by Samuel R. Greene
Cover of the book Between Two Worlds by Samuel R. Greene
Cover of the book Writing Beijing by Samuel R. Greene
Cover of the book Eurasia on the Edge by Samuel R. Greene
Cover of the book Central Asian Cultures, Arts, and Architecture by Samuel R. Greene
Cover of the book Millennial Culture and Communication Pedagogies by Samuel R. Greene
Cover of the book Animal Property Rights by Samuel R. Greene
Cover of the book Transnational Geographers in the United States by Samuel R. Greene
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy