Author: | Progressive Management | ISBN: | 9781311826312 |
Publisher: | Progressive Management | Publication: | February 4, 2016 |
Imprint: | Smashwords Edition | Language: | English |
Author: | Progressive Management |
ISBN: | 9781311826312 |
Publisher: | Progressive Management |
Publication: | February 4, 2016 |
Imprint: | Smashwords Edition |
Language: | English |
Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this study examines the history and current status of ISIS. In an effort to understand how the IS became what it is today, this report begins by examining the origins of the group in the late 1990s in Afghanistan. This report finds that the evolution of the IS is best understood as an outcome of both design and accidents. It is an outcome of design because the group's territorial gains and governance, according to what it believes to be Islamic teachings, were part of the vision of its founder, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, since at least 1999. But, the IS is also an outcome of accidents that allowed the group to exploit the militant landscape in Syria as well as the politics of sectarianism that adversely affected Iraq's Arab Sunnis.
The design and accidents that allowed the IS to achieve its current status also placed it in direct conflict with the most prominent global jihadi organization of recent memory: al-Qa'ida (AQ). For while AQ considered itself as an anti-establishment global force of "jihadis without borders," al-Zarqawi's vision for his organization (the predecessor of the IS) was one of building an establishment, a vision that his successors are seeking to translate into a reality. The announcement of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the expansion it signaled was likely perceived by AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri as an attempt to upstage AQ and led al-Zawahiri to intervene to annul the ISIL. When his judgment was ignored, AQ publicly disowned the ISIL in February 2014.
Introduction * Metamorphosis: From al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad to Dawlat al-Khilafa (2003-2014) * A Society (mujtama') in the Making During Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's Era * The March to "Statehood" * Parting Ways with al-Qa'ida * What is the difference between the "Islamic state" of 2006 and that of 2014? * The Sectarian Factor * Goals and Methods: Comparing Three Militant Groups * The Islamic State: An Adaptive Organization Facing Increasing Challenges * Trends in IS Military Operations * Communicating Fear and Vision: The Media Organization of the IS * The Diverse Financial Portfolio of the Islamic State * After the "Fighting" Is Over: The Struggles of the IS to Establish Governance * The Sum of the Parts: How the Islamic State Brings Everything Together * The Strategic Implications of Combating the IS * Means, Ends, and Countering the IS * Winning the War of Ideas * The Foreign Fighter Threat * The Way Ahead
The Syrian civil war has proven to be a significant draw to individuals from around the world. While many countries are justifiably concerned about the threat posed by "battle-hardened fighters [who] could return to their home countries and attempt terror attacks," there are other aspects of the foreign fighter threat that receive less attention but deserve more scrutiny. Recent history suggests that it is more likely that threats will come from diverted foreign fighters, homegrown terrorists who never fight abroad but are inspired by the IS's ideology, and fighters sent from the IS to the West through other creative means.
Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this study examines the history and current status of ISIS. In an effort to understand how the IS became what it is today, this report begins by examining the origins of the group in the late 1990s in Afghanistan. This report finds that the evolution of the IS is best understood as an outcome of both design and accidents. It is an outcome of design because the group's territorial gains and governance, according to what it believes to be Islamic teachings, were part of the vision of its founder, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, since at least 1999. But, the IS is also an outcome of accidents that allowed the group to exploit the militant landscape in Syria as well as the politics of sectarianism that adversely affected Iraq's Arab Sunnis.
The design and accidents that allowed the IS to achieve its current status also placed it in direct conflict with the most prominent global jihadi organization of recent memory: al-Qa'ida (AQ). For while AQ considered itself as an anti-establishment global force of "jihadis without borders," al-Zarqawi's vision for his organization (the predecessor of the IS) was one of building an establishment, a vision that his successors are seeking to translate into a reality. The announcement of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the expansion it signaled was likely perceived by AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri as an attempt to upstage AQ and led al-Zawahiri to intervene to annul the ISIL. When his judgment was ignored, AQ publicly disowned the ISIL in February 2014.
Introduction * Metamorphosis: From al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad to Dawlat al-Khilafa (2003-2014) * A Society (mujtama') in the Making During Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's Era * The March to "Statehood" * Parting Ways with al-Qa'ida * What is the difference between the "Islamic state" of 2006 and that of 2014? * The Sectarian Factor * Goals and Methods: Comparing Three Militant Groups * The Islamic State: An Adaptive Organization Facing Increasing Challenges * Trends in IS Military Operations * Communicating Fear and Vision: The Media Organization of the IS * The Diverse Financial Portfolio of the Islamic State * After the "Fighting" Is Over: The Struggles of the IS to Establish Governance * The Sum of the Parts: How the Islamic State Brings Everything Together * The Strategic Implications of Combating the IS * Means, Ends, and Countering the IS * Winning the War of Ideas * The Foreign Fighter Threat * The Way Ahead
The Syrian civil war has proven to be a significant draw to individuals from around the world. While many countries are justifiably concerned about the threat posed by "battle-hardened fighters [who] could return to their home countries and attempt terror attacks," there are other aspects of the foreign fighter threat that receive less attention but deserve more scrutiny. Recent history suggests that it is more likely that threats will come from diverted foreign fighters, homegrown terrorists who never fight abroad but are inspired by the IS's ideology, and fighters sent from the IS to the West through other creative means.