The Impact Of Political-Military Relations On The Use Of German Military Power During Operation Barbarossa

Nonfiction, History, Germany, European General, Military, United States
Cover of the book The Impact Of Political-Military Relations On The Use Of German Military Power During Operation Barbarossa by LCDR Richard Carnicky USN, Verdun Press
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: LCDR Richard Carnicky USN ISBN: 9781786250315
Publisher: Verdun Press Publication: November 6, 2015
Imprint: Verdun Press Language: English
Author: LCDR Richard Carnicky USN
ISBN: 9781786250315
Publisher: Verdun Press
Publication: November 6, 2015
Imprint: Verdun Press
Language: English

The German General Staff launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 assuming the eastern campaign would last only three months. However, within six months after the initiation of hostilities the Red Army blunted the Wehrmacht’s attack outside the gates of Moscow, Operation Barbarossa had failed. Although a long standing and professional organization the German General Staff failed to achieve strategic success, despite significant success during the early stages of the campaign. Adolf Hitler’s national goal of Russian extermination exceeded the German Army’s capabilities. The war lasted nearly four years and resulted in the devastation of western Russia, millions dead and the destruction of Germany. This thesis examines how the divergence between the Wehrmacht’s capabilities and Hitler’s ideological national objectives affected Operation Barbarossa.

Through examination of the historical role the German General Staff held during military operations, this study addresses the linkage between German political and military relations during war. It begins with an analysis of the Prussian General Staff system under Moltke the elder. It follows the staff’s development through the wars of German unification, prelude to World War I and, the interwar period leading up to Hitler’s rise to power. It concludes with an analysis of Operation Barbarossa and the German General Staff’s efforts to achieve strategic victory on the eastern front. Finally, it concludes with lessons modern military leaders should learn from the General Staff’s mistakes.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

The German General Staff launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 assuming the eastern campaign would last only three months. However, within six months after the initiation of hostilities the Red Army blunted the Wehrmacht’s attack outside the gates of Moscow, Operation Barbarossa had failed. Although a long standing and professional organization the German General Staff failed to achieve strategic success, despite significant success during the early stages of the campaign. Adolf Hitler’s national goal of Russian extermination exceeded the German Army’s capabilities. The war lasted nearly four years and resulted in the devastation of western Russia, millions dead and the destruction of Germany. This thesis examines how the divergence between the Wehrmacht’s capabilities and Hitler’s ideological national objectives affected Operation Barbarossa.

Through examination of the historical role the German General Staff held during military operations, this study addresses the linkage between German political and military relations during war. It begins with an analysis of the Prussian General Staff system under Moltke the elder. It follows the staff’s development through the wars of German unification, prelude to World War I and, the interwar period leading up to Hitler’s rise to power. It concludes with an analysis of Operation Barbarossa and the German General Staff’s efforts to achieve strategic victory on the eastern front. Finally, it concludes with lessons modern military leaders should learn from the General Staff’s mistakes.

More books from Verdun Press

Cover of the book Commonalities In Russian Military Operations In Urban Environments by LCDR Richard Carnicky USN
Cover of the book Admiral Halsey’s Story [Illustrated Edition] by LCDR Richard Carnicky USN
Cover of the book Imperial Japanese Navy Campaign Planning And Design Of The Aleutian-Midway Campaign by LCDR Richard Carnicky USN
Cover of the book Campaign Planning: A Doctrinal Assessment Through The Study Of The Japanese Campaign Of 1942 by LCDR Richard Carnicky USN
Cover of the book Admiral Raymond A. Spruance: Lessons In Adaptation From The Pacific by LCDR Richard Carnicky USN
Cover of the book Timoshenko, Marshal Of The Red Army: A Study by LCDR Richard Carnicky USN
Cover of the book August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive In Manchuria [Illustrated Edition] by LCDR Richard Carnicky USN
Cover of the book Australian Light Horse: A Study Of The Evolution Of Tactical And Operational Maneuver by LCDR Richard Carnicky USN
Cover of the book Setting Sun: A Critical Analysis Of Japan’s Employment Of Naval Airpower In The Battle Of The Coral Sea by LCDR Richard Carnicky USN
Cover of the book The History Of The Canterbury Mounted Rifles 1914-1919 [Illustrated Edition] by LCDR Richard Carnicky USN
Cover of the book The Lost War: by LCDR Richard Carnicky USN
Cover of the book Lithuanian Freedom Fighters' Tactics: Resisting The Soviet Occupation 1944-1953 by LCDR Richard Carnicky USN
Cover of the book The Coldstream Guards, 1914-1918 Vol. II [Illustrated Edition] by LCDR Richard Carnicky USN
Cover of the book Partisans of the Kuban by LCDR Richard Carnicky USN
Cover of the book Slim Chance: The Pivotal Role Of Air Mobility In The Burma Campaign by LCDR Richard Carnicky USN
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy