The Impact Of Political-Military Relations On The Use Of German Military Power During Operation Barbarossa

Nonfiction, History, Germany, European General, Military, United States
Cover of the book The Impact Of Political-Military Relations On The Use Of German Military Power During Operation Barbarossa by LCDR Richard Carnicky USN, Verdun Press
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Author: LCDR Richard Carnicky USN ISBN: 9781786250315
Publisher: Verdun Press Publication: November 6, 2015
Imprint: Verdun Press Language: English
Author: LCDR Richard Carnicky USN
ISBN: 9781786250315
Publisher: Verdun Press
Publication: November 6, 2015
Imprint: Verdun Press
Language: English

The German General Staff launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 assuming the eastern campaign would last only three months. However, within six months after the initiation of hostilities the Red Army blunted the Wehrmacht’s attack outside the gates of Moscow, Operation Barbarossa had failed. Although a long standing and professional organization the German General Staff failed to achieve strategic success, despite significant success during the early stages of the campaign. Adolf Hitler’s national goal of Russian extermination exceeded the German Army’s capabilities. The war lasted nearly four years and resulted in the devastation of western Russia, millions dead and the destruction of Germany. This thesis examines how the divergence between the Wehrmacht’s capabilities and Hitler’s ideological national objectives affected Operation Barbarossa.

Through examination of the historical role the German General Staff held during military operations, this study addresses the linkage between German political and military relations during war. It begins with an analysis of the Prussian General Staff system under Moltke the elder. It follows the staff’s development through the wars of German unification, prelude to World War I and, the interwar period leading up to Hitler’s rise to power. It concludes with an analysis of Operation Barbarossa and the German General Staff’s efforts to achieve strategic victory on the eastern front. Finally, it concludes with lessons modern military leaders should learn from the General Staff’s mistakes.

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The German General Staff launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 assuming the eastern campaign would last only three months. However, within six months after the initiation of hostilities the Red Army blunted the Wehrmacht’s attack outside the gates of Moscow, Operation Barbarossa had failed. Although a long standing and professional organization the German General Staff failed to achieve strategic success, despite significant success during the early stages of the campaign. Adolf Hitler’s national goal of Russian extermination exceeded the German Army’s capabilities. The war lasted nearly four years and resulted in the devastation of western Russia, millions dead and the destruction of Germany. This thesis examines how the divergence between the Wehrmacht’s capabilities and Hitler’s ideological national objectives affected Operation Barbarossa.

Through examination of the historical role the German General Staff held during military operations, this study addresses the linkage between German political and military relations during war. It begins with an analysis of the Prussian General Staff system under Moltke the elder. It follows the staff’s development through the wars of German unification, prelude to World War I and, the interwar period leading up to Hitler’s rise to power. It concludes with an analysis of Operation Barbarossa and the German General Staff’s efforts to achieve strategic victory on the eastern front. Finally, it concludes with lessons modern military leaders should learn from the General Staff’s mistakes.

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