The Poverty of Conceptual Truth

Kant's Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics

Nonfiction, Religion & Spirituality, Philosophy, Logic, Modern
Cover of the book The Poverty of Conceptual Truth by R. Lanier Anderson, OUP Oxford
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: R. Lanier Anderson ISBN: 9780191044083
Publisher: OUP Oxford Publication: January 22, 2015
Imprint: OUP Oxford Language: English
Author: R. Lanier Anderson
ISBN: 9780191044083
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Publication: January 22, 2015
Imprint: OUP Oxford
Language: English

The Poverty of Conceptual Truth is based on a simple idea. Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments underwrites a powerful argument against the metaphysical program of his Leibnizian-Wolffian predecessors—an argument from fundamental limits on its expressive power. In that tradition, metaphysics promised to reveal the deep rational structure of the world through a systematic philosophy consisting of strictly conceptual truths, which flow from a logically perspicuous relation of 'containment' among concepts. That is, all truths would be 'analytic,' in Kant's sense. Kant's distinction shows to the contrary that far reaching and scientifically indispensable parts of our knowledge of the world (including mathematics, the foundations of natural science, all knowledge from experience, and the central principles of metaphysics itself) are essentially synthetic and could never be restated in analytic form. Thus, the metaphysics of Kant's predecessors is doomed, because knowledge crucial to any adequate theory of the world cannot even be expressed in the idiom to which it restricts itself (and which was the basis of its claim to provide a transparently rational account of things). Traditional metaphysics founders on the expressive poverty of conceptual truth. To establish these claims, R. Lanier Anderson shows how Kant's distinction can be given a clear basis within traditional logic, and traces Kant's long, difficult path to discovering it. Once analyticity is framed in clear logical terms, it is possible to reconstruct compelling arguments that elementary mathematics must be synthetic, and then to show how similar considerations about irreducible syntheticity animate Kant's famous arguments against traditional metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

The Poverty of Conceptual Truth is based on a simple idea. Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments underwrites a powerful argument against the metaphysical program of his Leibnizian-Wolffian predecessors—an argument from fundamental limits on its expressive power. In that tradition, metaphysics promised to reveal the deep rational structure of the world through a systematic philosophy consisting of strictly conceptual truths, which flow from a logically perspicuous relation of 'containment' among concepts. That is, all truths would be 'analytic,' in Kant's sense. Kant's distinction shows to the contrary that far reaching and scientifically indispensable parts of our knowledge of the world (including mathematics, the foundations of natural science, all knowledge from experience, and the central principles of metaphysics itself) are essentially synthetic and could never be restated in analytic form. Thus, the metaphysics of Kant's predecessors is doomed, because knowledge crucial to any adequate theory of the world cannot even be expressed in the idiom to which it restricts itself (and which was the basis of its claim to provide a transparently rational account of things). Traditional metaphysics founders on the expressive poverty of conceptual truth. To establish these claims, R. Lanier Anderson shows how Kant's distinction can be given a clear basis within traditional logic, and traces Kant's long, difficult path to discovering it. Once analyticity is framed in clear logical terms, it is possible to reconstruct compelling arguments that elementary mathematics must be synthetic, and then to show how similar considerations about irreducible syntheticity animate Kant's famous arguments against traditional metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason.

More books from OUP Oxford

Cover of the book The Christian Hope by R. Lanier Anderson
Cover of the book The Scottish Question by R. Lanier Anderson
Cover of the book Navigation: A Very Short Introduction by R. Lanier Anderson
Cover of the book Third World Protest by R. Lanier Anderson
Cover of the book Brute Facts by R. Lanier Anderson
Cover of the book Justice, Mercy, and Caprice by R. Lanier Anderson
Cover of the book Emotion and Value by R. Lanier Anderson
Cover of the book Magnetism: A Very Short Introduction by R. Lanier Anderson
Cover of the book Interperspectival Content by R. Lanier Anderson
Cover of the book Oxford Textbook of Rheumatology by R. Lanier Anderson
Cover of the book Re-Envisioning Christian Humanism by R. Lanier Anderson
Cover of the book Principles of Evolutionary Medicine by R. Lanier Anderson
Cover of the book Drug and Device Product Liability Litigation Strategy by R. Lanier Anderson
Cover of the book The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency by R. Lanier Anderson
Cover of the book Islamic Finance by R. Lanier Anderson
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy