On the Far Bank: The Effects of Gap Crossing on Operational Reach - Studies of Three Large-scale, Opposed River Crossings in World War II and Arab-Israeli War: Operations Market Garden, Plunder, Badr

Nonfiction, History, Military, United States, World War II
Cover of the book On the Far Bank: The Effects of Gap Crossing on Operational Reach - Studies of Three Large-scale, Opposed River Crossings in World War II and Arab-Israeli War: Operations Market Garden, Plunder, Badr by Progressive Management, Progressive Management
View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart
Author: Progressive Management ISBN: 9781370886678
Publisher: Progressive Management Publication: January 30, 2017
Imprint: Smashwords Edition Language: English
Author: Progressive Management
ISBN: 9781370886678
Publisher: Progressive Management
Publication: January 30, 2017
Imprint: Smashwords Edition
Language: English

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. Throughout history, opposed river crossing operations have proven to be some of the bloodiest and most complex endeavors for any military force. However, due to a sixty-year lull in having to cross a river in the face of the enemy, the United States Army has shown a trend of diminishing its resource capacity necessary to conduct these crossings, and is losing doctrinal focus for the task. Most significantly, doctrine does not provide an appreciation for the large impacts a river crossing has on the remainder of an operation. This analysis looks at three large-scale, opposed river crossing operations in the mechanized warfare era. All three cases involve a successful opposed river crossing, but vary in the level of operational reach or time before culmination. The variance in each case stems from the preparation for and execution of the river crossing. The analysis identifies three elements that had the greatest impact on the operational reach of units after the river crossing: the rapid employment of overwhelming strength, a deliberate plan to provide assault crossing resources regardless of existing bridges, and a detailed plan that included the transition from bridgehead to breakout operations.

The recorded history of ground combat has shown that river crossing operations have always been a focal point for planners. The great military thinker Carl von Clausewitz himself devoted a chapter of his masterpiece On War to this subject. In it, he referred to the "respect in which an attack on a defended river is held by most generals." While evidence in past military theory and history repeatedly demonstrated the importance of this tactical task, the recent history of the United States Army reveals a decrease in the frequency of attacks over well-defended rivers. The United States Army has not conducted an opposed, deliberate wet gap crossing since World War II.

Future combat operations, however, could require gap crossings and the Army must remain proficient in planning for and conducting them. Rivers that would require non-hasty crossing methods exist in every geographic region, meaning that any future Army operation against a conventional force could require a deliberate gap crossing. History demonstrates the importance of the tactical task of gap crossing to overall mission accomplishment. Some of the most successful gap crossings in history involved entire armies of multiple corps focused on nothing but establishing a bridgehead, as with the spring 1945 Rhine crossing's in World War II and Operation Badr in the Arab-Israeli War. History also demonstrates that operations can fail in spite of a successful gap crossing. The Allied failure in Operation Market-Garden during World War II showed that successfully crossing a river such as the Waal does not necessarily lead to operational success. If in planning and execution, commanders and their staffs do not integrate the gap crossing with other tactical actions effectively, the operation may culminate earlier than expected.

Despite historical evidence that demonstrates the challenges associated with gap crossings, after a seventy-year lull in US experience with opposed crossings the United States Army gradually diminished its efforts to prepare for gap crossing operations. Army leaders reduced the number of units and associated equipment that specialize in gap crossing. Most recently, they approved updated doctrine that relegates gap crossing—once the topic of a dedicated field manual—to a single chapter of the 2011 Combined Arms Mobility manual. Training centers have noted that current units struggle to plan and execute gap crossing operations.

View on Amazon View on AbeBooks View on Kobo View on B.Depository View on eBay View on Walmart

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. Throughout history, opposed river crossing operations have proven to be some of the bloodiest and most complex endeavors for any military force. However, due to a sixty-year lull in having to cross a river in the face of the enemy, the United States Army has shown a trend of diminishing its resource capacity necessary to conduct these crossings, and is losing doctrinal focus for the task. Most significantly, doctrine does not provide an appreciation for the large impacts a river crossing has on the remainder of an operation. This analysis looks at three large-scale, opposed river crossing operations in the mechanized warfare era. All three cases involve a successful opposed river crossing, but vary in the level of operational reach or time before culmination. The variance in each case stems from the preparation for and execution of the river crossing. The analysis identifies three elements that had the greatest impact on the operational reach of units after the river crossing: the rapid employment of overwhelming strength, a deliberate plan to provide assault crossing resources regardless of existing bridges, and a detailed plan that included the transition from bridgehead to breakout operations.

The recorded history of ground combat has shown that river crossing operations have always been a focal point for planners. The great military thinker Carl von Clausewitz himself devoted a chapter of his masterpiece On War to this subject. In it, he referred to the "respect in which an attack on a defended river is held by most generals." While evidence in past military theory and history repeatedly demonstrated the importance of this tactical task, the recent history of the United States Army reveals a decrease in the frequency of attacks over well-defended rivers. The United States Army has not conducted an opposed, deliberate wet gap crossing since World War II.

Future combat operations, however, could require gap crossings and the Army must remain proficient in planning for and conducting them. Rivers that would require non-hasty crossing methods exist in every geographic region, meaning that any future Army operation against a conventional force could require a deliberate gap crossing. History demonstrates the importance of the tactical task of gap crossing to overall mission accomplishment. Some of the most successful gap crossings in history involved entire armies of multiple corps focused on nothing but establishing a bridgehead, as with the spring 1945 Rhine crossing's in World War II and Operation Badr in the Arab-Israeli War. History also demonstrates that operations can fail in spite of a successful gap crossing. The Allied failure in Operation Market-Garden during World War II showed that successfully crossing a river such as the Waal does not necessarily lead to operational success. If in planning and execution, commanders and their staffs do not integrate the gap crossing with other tactical actions effectively, the operation may culminate earlier than expected.

Despite historical evidence that demonstrates the challenges associated with gap crossings, after a seventy-year lull in US experience with opposed crossings the United States Army gradually diminished its efforts to prepare for gap crossing operations. Army leaders reduced the number of units and associated equipment that specialize in gap crossing. Most recently, they approved updated doctrine that relegates gap crossing—once the topic of a dedicated field manual—to a single chapter of the 2011 Combined Arms Mobility manual. Training centers have noted that current units struggle to plan and execute gap crossing operations.

More books from Progressive Management

Cover of the book History of the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) - Nuclear Weapons, Cold War Strategy, Service Rivalries, Arms Control by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Documents: Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations (Joint Publication 3-59) - 2012 Version, Collection, Analysis, Prediction, Data Sources by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Battle on the Bookshelves: History, Desert Storm, and the United States Armed Forces - Defense Department Uses Various Versions of History to Shape Perceptions of Accomplishments, Influence Decisions by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Papers - The Government Assistance Center: A Vehicle for Transitioning to the Host Government by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Oman in Perspective: Orientation Guide: Geography, History, Economy, Security, Muscat, Salalah, Nizwa, Yarubi Imamate, Sultan Qaboos bin Said, Baluchi, Lawatiyya, Khojas, Rustaq, Slave Trade by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century FEMA Study Course: Workplace Security Awareness (IS-906) - Access Control, ID Badges, Scenarios and Procedures, Bomb Threat Checklist, Identity Theft by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 90,000 Tons of Diplomacy: How the U.S. Navy Supports Naval Aviation - Aircraft Carrier Fleet for America's Worldwide Commitment, Conducting Contingency Operations, History of Naval Aviation Interest by Progressive Management
Cover of the book German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Islamist Jihadist Mobilization, Muslim Radicalization, ISIS, Syrian Civil War, Terrorist Online Recruiting, Salafism, Migrant Integration, Millatu Ibrahim by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Cold War Infrastructure for Air Defense: The Fighter and Command Missions - SAC, ADC, ANG, TAC, SAGE, Alert Hangars, Simulator, Aircraft Shelters, Air Force Bases from Barksdale to Whiteman by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 2012 Smart Grid System Report to Congress: Smart Electric Meters, Renewables Integration, Electric Cars and Vehicles, Transmission Automation, Grants and Programs, Cyber Security, Energy Efficiency by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century Space Elevators: Advanced Earth-Space Infrastructure: NASA Report on Technology, Plans, Concepts, Materials, Environmental and Safety Issues by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Brazil in Perspective: Orientation Guide and Portuguese Cultural Orientation: Geography, History, Economy, Society, Security, Military, Religion, Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Guiana Highlands, Amazon by Progressive Management
Cover of the book Trinity: The World's First Atomic Explosion - History of the Atomic Bomb Test and the New Mexico Test Site, Rehearsal Shot, Report on Nuclear Energy Released, Damage Effects, Observations by Progressive Management
Cover of the book The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028: TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, How the Army Fights, Organizing for Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security, Training and Education by Progressive Management
Cover of the book 21st Century U.S. Military Manuals: The Soldier's Blue Book - The Guide for Initial Entry Training Soldiers, TRADOC 600-4, Basic Combat Training, Standards of Conduct (Professional Format Series) by Progressive Management
We use our own "cookies" and third party cookies to improve services and to see statistical information. By using this website, you agree to our Privacy Policy